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A Strategic Look at the Civil War
The late Peter J. Parish often voiced the opinion that although some Civil
War topics have ‘been done to death’, a surprising number of the more
significant themes were neglected or even ignored. The broader question of
morale, for instance, - especially on the home front – constituted one of these.
Another, related to morale, is strategy. This neglect is quite extraordinary
considering the vast literature on the military history of 1861-65. Historians have
debated some of the issues raised by Confederate strategy, but general questions
have excited little interest. Donald Stoker has set out to rectify this deficiency.
He is well-qualified to do so, as he currently serves as Professor of Strategy and
Policy for the US Naval War College program at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California.
Stoker begins by exploring the reasons for the neglect of his chosen subject.
He puts it down to the preoccupation of historians and indeed the readers of Civil
War history, with battles. They approach battles with the enthusiasm of
spectators at a sporting match. Battles are important as victory is preferable to
defeat, whether or not they prove to be ‘decisive’. But commanders must do
more than just win battles they have to demonstrate the necessary resilience and
intellectual power to encompass all the elements that secure victory in war. “This
is why strategy matters," Stoker concludes crisply (2). He presents Civil War
strategy as a coherent ‘story’ based on a detailed study of the Official Records
(1880). His perspectives are also informed by the renaissance of American
military thought 1975-95 that led to a fresh understanding and enthusiasm for the
ideas of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War (1832); also to an appreciation of the
work of his better-known contemporary, Baron Jomini, who had been written off
by an earlier generation of historians as a source of error.
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It is strategy Stoker affirms zealously, that determines the course of all wars
as it did in the American Civil War. But what is it and how do we define it
exactly? The starting point is government policy. Stoker holds that policy
“should inform strategy...but not dictate it" (5). This is a contentious opening, as
the strategy of democracies should never be subordinated to military
considerations. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that policy objectives are ‘critical’
because they determine “so much of where and how the war will be fought" (5).
And indeed there can be no quarrel with Stoker’s straight-forward assertion that
“strategy defines how military force is used in pursuit of the political goal" (5).
But again this definition veers towards giving too much attention to military
strategy and not enough to questions of grand strategy, not least dilemmas raised
by foreign policy.
Despite some doubts over the book’s fundamental perspective, one cannot
praise too highly the depth and acuity of the analysis that Stoker deploys in a
trenchant and refreshingly well-written book, mercifully free of dreary jargon.
Stoker touches upon most of the debates among Civil War historians. He
downplays the overall significance of technology, arguing that it mainly affected
tactics, not strategy, though such an assertion underestimates the strategic
significance of railroads. Stoker occasionally presents himself too
self-consciously as a lonely pioneer, as when he rejects the “definitional mess"
surrounding the debate over whether the Civil War assumed a ‘total’ form (6).
He equates totality with the nature of a war’s objective, for belligerent
populations will fight hard either to attain an aim or resist it, should the aim be
viewed as precious or repellent. This conclusion seems to be a very indirect way
of agreeing with earlier historians that the Civil War was indeed a ‘total war‘.
Yet there can be no denying that henceforth no historian of the subject can afford
to ignore Stoker’s views, and the legions of Civil War readers must be prepared
to have their horizons stretched.
On the Union side, Stoker makes a persuasive case for both the importance
of the blockade and its efficacy. His treatment of George B. McClellan’s strategy
while general-in-chief is impressively even-handed. He makes a strong case for
McClellan’s initial November 1861 appreciation that T. Harry Williams, among
other historians, ridiculed. McClellan’s strategy comprised a series of
simultaneous offensives enhanced by amphibious operations. But he is not blind
to McClellan’s errors, delusions and paranoia; and his preference for limited
methods that protected the property of the civilian population earns Stoker’s
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condemnation for failing to understand the nature of the war in which he was
engaged. At various points, one would have preferred to see more coverage of
the systemic weaknesses of US military organization and the command system,
the strategic impact of which Stoker acknowledges only in passing (194). He is
very critical of the lack of enterprise and inability of Don Carlos Buell to obey
orders; he is scathing of Henry W. Halleck’s procrastination and congenital
inability to see his orders carried out. But all contemporaries regarded the army
level as the most important; in the absence of a general staff system it is difficult
to see how the general-in-chief could enforce his instructions.
McClellan tried to resolve these difficulties by combining the levels in his
own person, but he became over-burdened and his failures in both areas
redounded to his discredit. McClellan could not adjudicate between conflicting
priorities and competing resources because, as an army commander, he was a
self-interested party, and kept his subordinates weak, so that his own ‘decisive’
operations on the Peninsula could be the strongest. Such structural weaknesses
were just as significant as personal failures when calculating the reasons for the
Union failure to win the war by the autumn of 1862.
Similar systemic cavities were even more pronounced in the Confederacy.
Stoker offers some telling criticisms of the southern inability to think
strategically; calm, wide-ranging deliberation seems conspicuous by its absence
in the highest levels of the Confederate government – though he praises the
insights of Robert E. Lee highly. Stoker is especially critical of the hasty
decision to precipitate the war before the Confederacy was ready to fight it. He
claims with every justification that not only did the South fight the war
materially above its weight, but also intellectually. He considers Jefferson
Davis’s decision to act as his own general-in-chief a disaster, as his methods
combined excessive centralization with a singular failure to adumbrate a clear
strategy and stick to it. The South was simply too weak to profit from its initial
attachment to a ‘cordon’ strategy, which was more an impulse than a true
strategy, and its commitment to the spurious ‘King Cotton’ embargo even more
disastrous; both compounded southern weakness, representing a winding country
lane to defeat rather than the highway to victory. Leonidas Polk’s thoughtless
violation of Kentucky’s ‘neutrality’ exposed the entire Mississippi basin to
Union attack. Confederate defeat cannot be described as inevitable, for the South
demonstrated a capacity to launch a counter stroke in the autumn of 1862. But
the connection of these thrusts with a strategic plan, Stoker holds, was incidental
at best.
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He also makes two other significant points that concur with the views of this
reviewer. First, the defensive could not serve as a panacea that could solve all the
South’s woes; secondly, the Eastern theatre remained the Confederate ‘centre of
gravity’ in Clausewitzan terms. Yet the South’s chances of winning declined
drastically after September-October 1862 because “The Confederate system,
leadership, and strategic environment all contributed" to southern defeat (27).
Not all Stoker’s arguments carry equal conviction. He is full of praise for
Lincoln (though he regards his genius as political rather than military). His
central strategic insight grasped that Confederate armies were its true centre of
gravity for without them it would collapse. Yet Stoker is not always consistent in
exploring this theme, especially in relation to geographical objectives, notably
towns and cities. He argues earlier that “the most important line of advance that
the Union could choose" in 1862 was Chattanooga; but later he is critical of the
“obsession" with Tennessee (115). Sherman’s marches are applauded as
“strategy at its grandest" but their object was not the destruction of a Confederate
army but the erosion of the southern will to continue the war (381).
Three other themes do not receive a very impressive treatment. First,
civil-military relations, though Stoker stresses their ‘significant impact’ on
strategy’s creation at the outset, they are discussed incidentally and the
importance of political party considerations is ignored (4). Secondly, the
international dimension only receives a sketchy outline. Here it is significant that
Stern criticizes the Red River campaign because it did not contribute to
Confederate defeat, when it had important, long-term foreign policy objectives.
Thirdly, Stoker pays little attention to the problem of logistical sustainability
when mounting advances over such great distances. Here Stoker’s view that
operations in the Mississippi basin were a “glaring mistake" does not convince
(229). Eventual control of this vast waterway, as Stoker eventually concedes,
aided sustainability of all Union advances because it formed an invulnerable
supply route (317-18).
Most books that open up neglected topics tend to provoke as much
disagreement as agreement, and this one is no exception. Yet it certainly
stimulates and sets the thoughts racing – even though it might not provide all the
answers to the many questions raised.
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